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BOOK REVIEW - ESCAPE OF THE
GUILTY: WHAT A WISCONSIN
TRIAL JUDGE THINKS ABOUT
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM
BY DAVID E. SCHULTZ*
Escape of the Guilty,1 by Milwaukee County Circuit Judge
Ralph Adam Fine, promises to tell "the untold story" that the
criminal justice system is not doing its job. In the author's
words, "it seems more intent on finding reasons to let admit-
tedly guilty criminals escape punishment than in doing justice
for society."2 Judge Fine's premise is that there has been a
tremendous recent increase in crime, caused primarily by leni-
ent treatment of young offenders, by letting the guilty escape
punishment on technicalities and by compromising with those
who are held accountable for violating the law. Judge Fine
uses examples from his own experience and notorious cases
from around the country to illustrate the problems he sees in
current practice. He offers suggestions for addressing some of
those problems.
Judge Fine's book has generated considerable spirited de-
bate in Wisconsin and across the nation. It is difficult to re-
view only the book, ignoring the public statements made by
the author and those who disagree with him. The media re-
ports of the book's contents and of the author's positions often
state them more extremely than does the text itself. But one
must assume that the words in the book control and state the
author's true and considered position. In the interest of clar-
ity, this review will first try to summarize the book's contents
in impartial terms and then evaluate the positions advanced
by the text.
The first five chapters of Escape of the Guilty provide back-
ground and historical information intended to illustrate that
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School.
Since 1976, the reporter for the Wisconsin Jury Instructions-CriminaL
1. R.A. FINE, ESCAPE OF THE GUILTY (1986).
2. Id. at xii (1986).
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excessive reliance on plea bargaining is the primary reason for
the failure of the criminal justice system. Plea bargaining is
characterized as a "compromise with crime" based on expedi-
ency. These compromises make the work of judges and law-
yers easier, but hurt everyone else because the public interest
is not served by a system that gives deals to criminals. Bar-
gaining prevents successful deterrence because it obscures the
connection between illegal activity and its sanction. It teaches
the criminal that some violations will go unpunished and that
most can be discounted. It so separates the "pain signal" of
punishment from the criminal act that the system loses its
credibility. Even when the defendant really is not getting a
good deal, he thinks he is - and that is just as bad.
The primary basis for the criticism of plea bargaining is
that it harms society and gives criminals an undeserved break.
However, Judge Fine includes a chapter that points out that a
system based on plea bargaining hurts defendants as well. Re-
lying on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,3 Judge Fine points out that plea bar-
gaining has great potential for coercing pleas from the inno-
cent or punishing defendants for the exercise of their
constitutional right to a trial. He reemphasizes his belief that
the only reason for plea bargaining is that it makes things eas-
ier for everyone.
Chapter Five, "The Paml Shade," takes its attention-get-
ting title from the author's experience with a public television
auction. One of the to-be-auctioned items was identified as a
"paml shade" and was the subject of considerable bidding and
eventual sale. It was not until after the bidding had been com-
pleted that Judge Fine pointed out to the others that the ex-
otic "paml shade" was just a mistyped "lamp shade." The
judge uses this analogy to illustrate how people who are too
close to something or too familiar with details may lose sight
of the broader picture. Thus, judges and lawyers fail to realize
that there is no history to support the practice of plea bargain-
ing and that it is not necessary as a practical matter. He says
3. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). In Bordenkircher, the United States Supreme Court held
that the due process clause is not violated when the prosecutor carries out a threat made
during plea negotiations to reindict the defendant on a habitual criminal charge carry-
ing a mandatory life sentence if he does not plead guilty to a five year felony based on
the uttering of an $88 forged check.
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that the United States Supreme Court decisions4 that explic-
itly recognize the value of the practice are simply wrong, and
he points to the banning of plea bargaining in Alaska as evi-
dence that the practice can be successfully abolished without
bringing ruin and breakdown to the system.
Chapters Six and Seven of Escape of the Guilty condemn
the Miranda 6 rule and the exclusionary rule of the fourth
amendment. Miranda is called a "cataclysmic" change that
has bred a series of hypertechnical rules that let the guilty go
free while depriving the courts of trustworthy evidence.7
Judge Fine's preference is first identified as a return to volun-
tariness as the sole criterion for judging the admission of con-
fessions. However, later on, the author says he would keep
the Miranda rule if it were his choice, though he feels that its
scope should be narrowed and applied "with common sense
and restraint."
Judge Fine's analysis of the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule is much like his Miranda critique. Mapp v. Ohio 8 is
characterized as a close case which was an unwise decision
with terrible consequences. Judge Fine believes that the crim-
inal should not go free when the constable blunders, and cites
the standard arguments in support of that view. However, as
with Miranda, Judge Fine admits that if it were up to him, he
would probably keep the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
but apply it with common sense.
4. Judge Fine refers to Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); North Caro-
lina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
5. The Alaska initiative is described in M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARK & T. WHITE,
ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING (National Institute of Justice 1980) [hereinafter M.
RUBINSTEIN].
6. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. The Miranda discussion includes reference to an unusual case of which I was not
aware. It was a California case where the defendant's statement was suppressed on a
four-to-three vote of the California Supreme Court. The defendant's attorney, who had
been successful in the state courts, wrote to the United States Supreme Court to protest
the "illogic of it all" and to protest the reduced protection his family now had as a result
of rules like these that freed criminals. Justice was ultimately served in this unusual
case when the defendant confessed again on television's 60 Minutes and that confession
was used against him in a later trial. This is intended to show that even lawyers who
"win" under these technical rules are bothered by the results. R.A. FINE, supra note 1,
at 137-40.
8. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp made the fourth amendment exclusionary rule appli-
cable to state practice.
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Chapters Eight and Nine return to the theme developed in
the plea bargaining discussion. The juvenile justice system is
brought to task for treating young people too leniently when
they are first exposed to the justice system. The judge feels
very strongly that this leniency teaches young people that they
can get away with breaking the law. Judge Fine would prefer
a return to the 'parens patriae"9 juvenile justice system which
was less formal and not governed by the criminal due process
rules. He feels that the adversary model does not fit the needs
of juvenile offenders and that it was a mistake to apply it to
the juvenile court. He looks back, apparently with approval,
to the days when it was assumed that young people were en-
tirely responsible for their actions, using the example of a
twelve-year-old who was executed for murder in 1820. Judge
Fine feels that prompt and significant punishment is "essential
to civilize our children" and cites a number of examples from
his one-year stint in the juvenile court in Milwaukee County
where lenient treatment led to a series of criminal violations
that escalated in seriousness. 10 In a few instances he spells out
in great detail his inability to obtain cooperation in getting
tough with juvenile offenders. Prosecutors, defense counsel,
social workers, probation officers, and psychologists are all
criticized for resisting efforts to hold young people responsible
for their criminal acts.
Chapters Ten and Eleven are devoted to exposing the falli-
bility of psychiatry and psychology, at least as those disci-
plines are applied in the criminal courtroom. He argues that
"mind science" is not a science at all, that mental health pro-
fessionals cannot agree on diagnoses and cannot tell the men-
tally ill from the sane, that "projective" tests like the
"Rohrschach" are not reliable," and that dangerousness or
other future behavior cannot be predicted. Judge Fine pro-
vides a readable and informative history of the insanity de-
fense and criticizes the broadening of its coverage as another
9. Parens patriae is a Latin phrase meaning "father of the country." Under this
doctine, the judge acts as a substitute father. R.A. FINE, supra note 1, at 169.
10. Id. at 175-91.
11. Projective tests "make the patient or subject 'project' his or her subconscious
emotion." The Rohrschach "inkblot" test is a projective test. "[T]he patient is asked to
describe how he or she perceives various abstract forms." R.A. FINE, supra note 1, at
210.
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example of judicial legislation, one that starts on the road to
excusing all crime as determined by factors other than per-
sonal blameworthiness. The ALI test, l" the most widely used
in current practice, is criticized as letting juries play "expert
roulette" with society's safety. The procedures governing the
release of persons found to be not responsible are also criti-
cized. The critique concludes, however, with a recognition
that the insanity defense should be preserved but that its ad-
ministration and the release of those found not guilty by rea-
son of insanity require a balance between the defendant's right
of freedom and the public's right to safety. Judge Fine feels
more weight has to be given to the rights of the public.
The final chapter summarizes Judge Fine's view that the
present administration of criminal justice is tainted with prac-
tices based on expediency, the rigid application of technical
rules, and inappropriate leniency. Additional examples em-
phasize the need for change and a final argument is made for
the proposition that punishment and retribution have a legiti-
mate function in criminal justice and that crime can be re-
duced if we increase the certainty and severity of punishment.
The necessary changes are: eliminate plea bargaining; modify
- if not eliminate - the exclusionary rules that suppress
highly probative evidence; eliminate the distorted application
of the insanity defense; and restore an equilibrium to commu-
nity values through the "expiation and catharsis of punish-
ment." Two "practical suggestions" are added to this general
prescription: members of the public should join or form court
watch groups to monitor and publicize what the lawyers and
judges are doing; and, members of the public should contact
12. Section 971.15 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1985-86) adopts a standard based on
the model found in the American Law Institute's (ALI) Model Penal Code:
Mental responsibility of defendant. (1) A person is not responsible for criminal
conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this chapter, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antiso-
cial conduct.
(3) Mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative defense
which the defendant must establish to a reasonable certainty by the greater
weight of the credible evidence.
Wis. STAT. § 971.15 (1985-86).
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their legislators when they believe that the laws of the state
should be changed.
How effective is Escape of the Guilty in telling "the untold
story" of the failure of the criminal justice system? Answer-
ing this question requires considering two issues. First, is the
present system accurately described? Second, are solutions of-
fered to the problems that exist? As to the first issue, Judge
Fine's reliance on anecdotes and "horror stories" has great
potential for misleading the reader about how the present
criminal justice system operates. As to the second, nothing
new is offered as a solution beyond a cry to "get tough" and
"use common sense." These solutions are inadequate given
the complexity of the problems. To represent them as effec-
tive solutions is unfair to those who try to achieve justice in
the present system, especially given the relish with which past
problem cases are described. These general themes are re-
flected in different degrees by the discussion of each issue.
The chapters devoted to plea bargaining are the strongest
in the book. 13 The material is successful in getting the reader
(even one who is familiar with the system) to take a close look
at the emphasis the system places on bargaining in criminal
cases. Judge Fine believes that bargaining and compromise
inevitably lead criminals to believe that they can get away
with something and that the first of their crimes will be "free."
He convincingly argues that routine charge reductions depre-
ciate the seriousness of the offense that was really committed.
Burglaries become receipts of stolen property; robberies be-
come thefts from a person; sexual assaults become disorderly
conduct. Twenty separate crimes are charged as two, which
in turn are reduced. This pattern not only lets the criminal
avoid responsibility for what he has already done, but also dis-
guises his real record which misleads judges and prosecutors
when he comes into contact with the system again. Judge
Fine asserts that judges should follow his practice which he
characterizes as not participating in the plea bargaining pro-
cess. He tells defendants that he will not be bound by the
prosecutor's agreement. Most judges include this as part of
the plea acceptance colloquy in Wisconsin, 4 but apparently
13. Chapters one through five are devoted to the plea bargaining discussion.
14. See Wis JI-Criminal SM-32 (1985).
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Judge Fine impresses upon the parties that he really means it.
He follows the admirable practice of telling defendants that
they should not plead guilty unless they are guilty and that he
will not accept pleas from defendants who claim they are in-
nocent. The latter practice is especially commendable, as it
appears that few criminal defendants in Wisconsin enter pleas
of "guilty" anymore: pleas of "no contest" and "Alford" 15 are
becoming the rule rather than the exception in the state.
Whether present Wisconsin practice relies too heavily on plea
bargaining in light of the costs that are incurred is a question
that all prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges ought to
carefully consider.
However, the plea bargaining chapters are not without
flaws. First, Judge Fine flatly states that the primary reason
for plea bargaining is that it is easier for lawyers than going to
trial. While some prosecutors and some defense lawyers may
be lazy, basing the argument against plea bargaining almost
exclusively on that assumption lessens its impact. The enor-
mous criminal court caseload presently faced by most prose-
cutors and defenders is a very serious problem which must be
acknowledged in any attempt to analyze the deficiencies of the
system. 16 To recognize that heavy caseloads may encourage
plea bargaining is quite different from concluding that plea
bargaining is caused by lazy lawyers and judges. Some read-
ers may also feel that there is an over-reliance on "horror sto-
ries," examples where it is clear in retrospect that someone
made an unwise decision or took a gamble that backfired.
These "mistakes" can result from good faith decisions that are
not attributable to laziness or misplaced inclinations to leni-
15. The Alford plea takes its name from the decision in North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970), where the United States Supreme Court held that a guilty plea may
be accepted from a defendant who asserts innocence but nevertheless wishes to plead
guilty. In Alford, the defendant's plea to second degree murder allowed him to escape
the death penalty that might have been imposed if he had been convicted of first degree
murder after a trial. The legitimacy of the plea in Wisconsin practice (where the death
penalty is not a factor) has been recognized. See State v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657, 314
N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981).
16. Recent reports indicate that average misdemeanor caseloads for staff public de-
fenders are as high as 492 cases per year. Milw. J., Apr. 28, 1987, at B1, col. 1. Felony
caseloads are proportionately high. See also Phelps, Mounting Stress on Wisconsin's
Justice System, 60 Wis. B. BULL. No. 3, 32-34 (Mar. 1987).
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ency. They are inherent in any system that relies on the judg-
ment of individuals.
A second flaw in the plea bargaining discussion is the im-
plicit assumption that if plea bargaining is abolished at the in-
court level, it will truly go away. Every attempt to limit the
exercise of discretion at one stage of the criminal process inev-
itably leads to its reappearing at another usually less visible
point. Saying "there will be no charge reductions in this
court" will not automatically eliminate all plea negotiation at
earlier stages. The Alaska "no plea bargaining" experiment,
recommended as a cure by Judge Fine, has been extensively
studied. The conclusion was that it stopped overt sentence
bargaining between the prosecutor and the public defender.
But it was also concluded that while there was a substantial
increase in the number of trials, actual practice and sentencing
changed very little, except that harsher sentences were im-
posed for minor offenses and drug-related crimes. 7
The portion of the book criticizing Miranda and Mapp is
the weakest in the book. 8 The author's technique is to criti-
cize the cases as judicial legislation, point out that they were
decided by a five-to-four vote, and quote from the strongest
parts of the dissenting opinion to show the errors in the ma-
jority position. Chief Justice Warren, the author of Miranda,
is even criticized for not writing his own opinions.' 9 The
Brethren2 ° is cited as authority for the proposition that the
Chief Justice's law clerks were given great responsibility of
opinion-writing. Then a few examples are used to illustrate
just how nonsensical some courts have been in applying the
ill-advised rules. Some of the examples seem to be stretching
things a bit. Brewer v. Williamsz' is used as an example of the
ridiculous results that can follow from Miranda. That case, of
course, was not a Miranda case but was decided in its first
appearance before the United States Supreme Court on the
basis of a violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right
17. M. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 5, at vii-viii.
18. Chapters six and seven review the Supreme Court decisions of Miranda and
Mapp.
19. R.A. FINE, supra note 1, at 120.
20. R. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
21. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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to counsel.2 2 Proper identification of the case probably would
not detract from the author's basic point about the effects of
hypertechnical rules, but it is important to be cautious and not
misrepresent what the courts have done especially when writ-
ing for a non-lawyer audience. On a similar note, North Caro-
lina v. Butler23 has been ridiculed because a guilty defendant
almost got away on a technicality.
The discussion of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
overstates the impact of Mapp on criminal practice. Judge
Fine fails to mention that Wisconsin, like many states, had
applied the exclusionary rule to state practice long before the
United States Supreme Court required that it be extended to
the states in Mapp.2 4 In light of that, it seems unfair to char-
acterize the Mapp decision as a quirky five-to-four decision
that caused serious problems for state courts.
Whatever symbolic importance they have, the practical
impact of Miranda and the exclusionary rule should not be
exaggerated. Law enforcement agencies have not only learned
to live with these restrictions, but many feel that the profes-
sionalism of the police and the moral force of the law are
22. Brewer v. Williams has been before the United States Supreme Court on two
occasions. Williams was arrested on a warrant in Davenport, Iowa, and charged with
abducting a 10 year old girl. He was to be transported to Des Moines, Iowa, a trip of
about 160 miles. Although he was represented by counsel in Davenport and in Des
Moines, neither lawyer was allowed to make the trip with the police and Williams.
During the trip, apparently spurred on by the "Christian Burial Speech" of a detective,
Williams made statements that helped police find the little girl's body. At the time,
Brewer was touted as the case that would overrule Miranda. However, the Court held
that "there is no need to review in this case the doctrine of Miranda. . . [fgor it is clear
that the judgment before us must in any event be affirmed upon the ground that Wil-
liams was deprived of a different constitutional right - the right to the assistance of
counsel." Brewer, 430 U.S. at 397-98. The sixth amendment precludes questions delib-
erately elicited in the absence of counsel, after the right to counsel has attached. Thus
Williams' statements and the evidence flowing from them were suppressed.
The case returned to the United States Supreme Court in 1984. The Court held that
the evidence need not be suppressed because it "would inevitably have been discovered
without reference to the police error or misconduct." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
448 (1984).
23. In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979), the Court held that an
express waiver of Miranda rights is not required. In a proper case, waiver can be im-
plied from the actions and words of the suspect.
24. State v. Kriegbaum, 194 Wis. 229, 215 N.W. 896 (1927); Hoyer v. State, 180
Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923).
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greatly improved by the rules.15 Recent studies indicate that
the costs of the exclusion of illegally seized evidence have been
greatly overestimated.26 Decisions of the present Supreme
Court are putting considerable flexibility into the rules.27
Judge Fine notes some of these developments with approval in
his text. But it must come as a surprise to those who have
heard reports about the book to find out that Judge Fine con-
cludes that if it were his choice he would keep both Miranda
and the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. His conclusion
is that they serve a useful purpose, but should be applied
"with common sense and restraint. '28 That is good advice in
any situation, but it rings hollow in comparison to the inten-
sity of the criticism heaped on those rules in the text.
The critique of the juvenile justice system emphasizes the
same themes found in the discussion of plea bargaining. While
Judge Fine seems to have an extremely pessimistic view of the
nature of young children29 he raises an important question:
What is the most effective response when a young person first
commits a criminal act? His answer is to "get tough with de-
linquents early," and he cites authority supporting the propo-
25. The earliest comment in this regard was a law review article by J. Edgar Hoo-
ver cited in the Miranda opinion. Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The
Role of the FBI, 37 IOWA L. REV. 175 (1952) (cited in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 483 n.54 (1966)).
26. A number of studies on the effect of the exclusionary rules have been cited by
persons on both sides of the debate over whether the rules should be continued. Two of
the most complete discussions of these studies are Davies, A Hard Look at What We
Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ
Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 611-90;
Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 585-609.
27. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (statement obtained in violation
of Miranda does not automatically preclude the admissibility of a later statement that is
voluntary and follows proper Miranda advice); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) ("good faith exception" to
fourth amendment exclusionary rule in search warrant cases); Segura v. United States,
468 U.S. 796 (1984) ("independent source exception" to the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ("public safety exception" to
Miranda); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) ("inevitable discovery exception" to the
sixth amendment exclusionary rule).
28. R.A. FINE, supra note 1, at 158-59 (1986).
29. For example, Judge Fine quotes psychiatrist Manfred S. Guttmucher in stating
that children are "'amoral'" when born. He then refers to William Golding's Lord of
the Flies when commenting that they "quickly degenerate into manipulative savages" if
left alone. Id. at 173 (1986).
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sition that early punishment does deter young people from
committing future crimes. 30  But the prescription for juvenile
court success is not spelled out in detail. The basic message is
to send the person to reform school as soon as possible.
The discussion of the insanity defense is strong when it
discusses policy and reform. Judge Fine has to go quite far
afield (the "Durham" rule31 of the 1960's) to support the
claim that the trend is toward broadening the insanity defense
to excuse persons from responsibility for their criminal acts.
John Hinckley's attempted assassination of President Reagan
is criticized as the "most notorious example" of this trend,
one that caused a complete change in insanity defense practice
(referring to the change in federal law that followed the
Hinckley verdict). The text does not explain why the Hinck-
ley case is such a notorious example of an abuse of the system.
Granted, there could not have been a more prominent victim
or more visible crime, but Judge Fine does not argue that
Hinckley is not insane. Assuming Hinckley is truly insane, it
is not the definition of the standard or the burden of proof that
should be criticized, but rather the continued viability of the
entire insanity defense which ought to be open to question.
But the author does not recommend total abolition of this
longstanding doctrine. Rather, like the Miranda discussion,
this critique concludes that the insanity defense should be pre-
served but that more weight has to be given to the rights of the
public. Does this say any more than that the decisions relat-
ing to mentally ill defendants are, like decisions to charge or
reduce charges and decisions to suppress evidence, exceed-
ingly difficult ones?
Escape of the Guilty should be commended for its attempt
to stimulate the general public's interest in the success or fail-
ure of the criminal justice system. But it is a challenge to ar-
30. The text mentions two studies in support of the thesis that locking up children
deters future crime, while social welfare intervention breeds it. One was a study of the
Cambridge-Somerville (Massachusetts) Youth Project. The other was an unspecified
study from the late 1970's of the American Institutes for Research. Id. at 164-65.
31. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), adopted a test excus-
ing a person from criminal responsibility if the unlawful conduct was a "product" of
mental disease or defect. That broader test was intended to allow criminal courts to
take advantage of advances in mental health sciences. It has since been repudiated in
the District of Columbia (U.S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) and in one
state (Maine) that had adopted it.
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rive at the proper tone and approach for such an effort. On
the one hand, it should not be so technical, detailed, and full
of lawyer-like hedging that readers lose interest. On the other
hand, over-emphasizing the problems, unfairly criticizing
those who presently work in the system, and oversimplifying
the solutions achieves nothing of lasting value. Judge Fine
has not been entirely successful in walking this difficult line.
Regardless of one's judgment of the book as a whole, one
should appreciate the fact that a judge has invested the time
and effort necessary to describe his insights and reflect on his
experience. Trial judges have great responsibility for assuring
that proper procedures are followed in criminal cases and yet
they are often placed in a relatively passive role as far as af-
fecting the nature of those procedures is concerned. As Judge
Fine points out in his Preface, judges have the right, even the
duty, to speak out on matters affecting the administration of
justice. 2 Our able and experienced trial judges should take
more opportunities to exercise that right.
My own view of Judge Fine's effort is that if the book's
only purpose is to call attention to problems in the present
administration of justice and provide a historical background
for them, it is successful. To stimulate the interest of those
who normally do not pay attention to criminal justice is to
accomplish a great deal. And while the book is not specifi-
cally directed to persons with a professional interest in crimi-
nal justice, it will serve another purpose if it causes people to
reexamine accepted practices. But if Escape of the Guilty has
the more ambitious goal of advancing solutions to problems, it
falls short of achieving it. In the final analysis, Judge Fine
would not abolish the insanity defense, the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule, or the requirements of Miranda. So his
proposed solutions to the "escape of the guilty" boil down to
eliminating uncalled-for plea bargaining and getting tough
with offenders, especially young ones, when they first violate
32. The author refers to the Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Associ-
ation and Wisconsin's Code of Judicial Ethics which encourage judges to express their
views about the law and the administration of justice. R.A. FINE. supra note 1, at xii
(1986). For example, the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics provides: "A judge should
contribute to the public interest by advising, suggesting and supporting rules and legis-
lation which, from his or her judicial observation and experience, will improve the ad-
ministration ofjustice." WISCONSIN CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS SCR 60.01(14) (1986).
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the law. That these tactics will reduce crime is unproven. For
example, recent reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics
show that for the 1980-86 period, Alaska had the fastest grow-
ing prison population of any state (a whopping 191.9%). If
the ban on plea bargaining instituted in 1975 in Alaska was
intended to teach people that they would not get a bargain in
the courts and thus was to deter criminal activity, it does not
appear to have succeeded.
Advocating common sense application of legal rules and
harsher punishment for those who really deserve it is a plat-
form that is hard to criticize, but it is one that lacks depth and
detail. How society should deal with the tremendous amount
of crime that is committed and how the criminal justice sys-
tem should function at a time of overwhelming caseloads are
exceedingly important questions. They cannot be answered
simply by imposing mechanical limits on prosecutorial charg-
ing decisions or requiring harsher sentences for younger of-
fenders. To improve the criminal justice system requires that
careful attention be paid to attracting competent people to
work in the system and giving them the support they need to
do their jobs well. Thanks to Escape of the Guilty, some of the
problems with our current system are exposed. Despite Judge
Fine's efforts, we must continue to look for truly effective
solutions.
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